Introduction
The thesis put forward in this article is that the international law of dispute settlement is transcending the phase of mere cooperation, as identified by Wolfgang Friedman, 1 and is displaying characteristics of a network. 'Cooperation' is the joint action of two or more subjects of international law or other international bodies, and means more than 'coexistence' or 'coordination'. It means proactively working together, serving objectives that cannot be attained by a single actor. 2 International cooperation is the guiding principle of the United Nations.
3 A general inter-state duty to cooperate in all fields is asserted by the Friendly Relations Declaration. 4 Specific duties of cooperation have been established (in more or less hard law and more or less consistently) in international economic relations. 5 In the 1970s and 1980s they were reclaimed with a view to a right to development, often associated with a novel concept of 'solidarity'. 6 Duties of cooperation play an important role in international environmental law 7 and in the battle against terrorism. 8 In contrast, the law of dispute settlement has rarely been analysed in this perspective.
I will argue that the international law of dispute settlement is not only built on cooperation, but even constitutes a network, as political scientists understand the term. 9 A network is a structure situated on the scale between a horizontal/loose/ market-like structure and a hierarchical/institutionalized/state-like one.
10 'In contrast to the type of a "state" with the structuring principle of hierarchy and of a
The International Law Principle of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
The principle of peaceful settlement of disputes is central to the UN system. It is enshrined in numerous conventions and is a customary law principle.
12 A 'dispute' was defined by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Mavrommatis case of 1924 as 'a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or interests between two persons'. 13 The principle of peaceful settlement of disputes relates to 'international' disputes 14 as opposed to 'national' or 'domestic' ones. What separates 'the international' from 'the national'? I submit that the international element lies neither in the trans-border dimension nor is the concept of international disputes restricted to disputes between states. The criterion of 'internationality' of a dispute lies in the legal substance of the dispute. International disputes are those in which the rivalling claims are based on international law. This will normally go hand in hand with the parties being (at least so-called 'limited') subjects of international law. Correspondingly, international dispute settlement is present when the competent body or mechanism (tribunal, settlement conference, or other) is (at least in part)
This includes international arbitration tribunals choosing as their procedural law (as the lex arbitri) the domestic law of their seat because such choice is allowed by international law. An international dispute (defined by the applicable law) may also be resolved by a national institution, e.g. by a domestic court. constituted under and functions according to international, not purely national, rules.
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The Traditional Canon of Dispute Settlement Strategies
The pacific means of dispute settlement are traditionally classified into two groups: diplomatic-political means on the one hand, and adjudicational-legal means on the other. This distinction is based on the standards applied and on the binding nature of the process. Diplomatic-political procedures (such as negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation) seek to reconcile interests and their outcome is not in itself binding. An ultimately binding result is reached only in the ideal case that the parties to the dispute reach an agreement. Legal-adjudicational procedures (arbitration and litigation) apply international law and determine rights; they culminate in a binding decision which cannot be unilaterally evaded by one party. I will now very briefly review the gamut of settlement strategies.
A 'Political' Means
Negotiation
Negotiation is communication, without third-party involvement, directed at achieving a joint decision. Negotiations are still the basic means of dispute settlement; 16 all settlement clauses incorporated in material treaties. 18 Negotiations aim to produce a consensual resolution to a dispute. Such resolution draws its legitimacy from consent, but this legitimacy is tainted by power disparities.
Fact-finding
The second diplomatic strategy is inquiry or fact-finding. The purpose of fact-finding commissions is to facilitate the solution of disputes arising predominantly from a difference of opinion on facts by elucidating these facts. 19 In recent decades, the concept of fact-finding has been visibly positively reappraised. 20 International conventions, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses of 1997, even provide for compulsory fact-finding in the event of a dispute.
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Commissions of inquiry have been established, both on the national plane after the collapse of illegitimate regimes (recall the Truth Commissions in South Africa), and on the international plane. One important example is Guatemala's Historical Clarification Commission, which has been characterized by its coordinator as a 'hybrid institution' 'located in a no man's land between domestic and international law'.
3 Mediation, Good Offices and Conciliation
The next so-called diplomatic strategies are mediation, good offices and conciliation. The description of international mediation given in Article 4 of the Convention for the 23 Good offices are very similar to mediation, and are not even specifically mentioned in Article 33 of the UN Charter. Conciliation differs from mediation only by degrees. Some distinguish these strategies by their state of institutionalization. Others emphasize the more limited mandate of the conciliator, who is in a strict sense not supposed to recommend solutions to the parties. But even if the mediator may be slightly more proactive than a classical conciliator, his proposals are only non-binding recommendations. Thus, importantly, these two strategies share the quality of not having the power to impose solutions, but only to assist the parties in crafting their own. I will therefore use these terms interchangeably.
24
In the last 20 years or so, mediation and conciliation (though, in general, not on the international plane) have been explored thoroughly by conflict-and negotiationtheory. The insights gained from these studies, together with growing dissatisfaction with domestic arbitration and litigation in particular sectors, have led to the new discipline of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). The main thrust of ADR literature is that 'alternative' means of dispute settlement are more flexible, more constructive, and avoid the typical adjudicatory winner-takes-all solution. It is therefore commonly assumed that in all situations in which the parties want to or have to continue their relationship after the dispute (the prime example in domestic law being divorce proceedings when children are involved), mediation is preferable to adjudication because it is less adversarial and creates more win-win types of solutions.
If this assumption is correct, we have quite a powerful argument for ADR on the international plane because in the age of globalization there are very few transnational relationships within the global fabric that can be completely disrupted in the aftermath of a dispute. Moreover, the mediator's decision can only be a non-binding proposal, but it is exactly this limited effect that is especially important in international law: it protects sovereignty.
If we now fuse the arguments for mediation and conciliation formulated by ADR theory with the traditional international law concern for sovereignty, international mediation or conciliation appears as the ideal dispute settlement strategy. It shares the advantages of adjudication, namely the issuance of an informed, reasoned, neutral judgment, while at the same time imposing no commitment on the parties to accept the recommended award -thus 'the niceties of sovereignty are observed', as Abram and Antonia Chayes put it.
25 This is the background to the recent popularity of optional mediation and conciliation rules in international instruments.
However, the expectations of theorists and law-makers have been defeated in 26 The Why is this so? The main reason seems to be that states want to externalize responsibility in order to appear in a better light before their constituencies. They want a binding decision by a tribunal or court in order to be able to say to the people: Look, we have fought hard for our position, now we can't help the result. It is not our fault, we have to abide with the decision of the arbitrators or judges.
B 'Legal' Means
The so-called legal means of dispute settlement are arbitration and adjudication.
The Blurry Distinction between Courts and Arbitration
The difference between arbitration and adjudication is that, at least in the perception of states, arbitration is more flexible overall because the principle of party autonomy governs the process. Therefore, international arbitration is traditionally considered as more yielding to sovereignty than litigation before an international court.
Arbitration
International arbitration can be divided into the classical state-state arbitration on the one hand, and state-private party arbitration on the other.
(a) State-state Arbitration Currently, the most important state-state arbitration is practised by WTO panels and the Appellate Body. A recent example of the institutionalization of state-state arbitration can be seen in the Ethiopian-Eritrean Boundary Commission and a Claims Commission, both created in 2000. 28 The establishment of these commissions is significant because two developing countries are involved, and it indicates that the ideological, highly sovereignty-conscious reserved attitude of so-called third world countries towards binding adjudication is most likely diminishing. The financing of these new bodies, however, remains a serious problem.
(b) Mixed Arbitration
The second type of international arbitration concerns disputes between states and private parties, mostly in commercial matters. The expansion of this 'mixed arbitration' is a 'quiet revolution' of international dispute settlement, and perhaps of ' The legal import of that obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct; the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result -nuclear disarmament in all its aspects -by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith' (emphasis added). Para. 100 speaks of a 'twofold obligation to pursue and to conclude negotiations'. These statements refer to a contractual obligation to negotiate an agreement independent of the existence of a concrete dispute, but they support the proposition that where concrete and measurable results are desired, obligations to reach this result are conceivable. looking at their possible legal foundation (good faith, Section 6) and at their contents (Sections 7-9), it seems useful to identify two only seemingly irreconcilable general concepts: the general duty of cooperation on the one hand (Section 3), and the principle of free choice on the other (Section 4).
The General Duty to Cooperate in Dispute Settlement
A general obligation to cooperate in the disposal of a given dispute receives specific mention in some international treaties and other documents. A most recent example is the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention of 1997, whose Article 10 paragraph 1 reads: 'The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention.' 39 Such cooperation involves action taken over a certain period of time, which may produce various positive results that are not definable ex ante. The general obligation to cooperate in that disposal is therefore an obligation of conduct. (In contrast, the obligation to settle disputes is an obligation to reach a particular and measurable outcome: the disposal of the dispute.
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It is submitted here that a contextualized, but still unspecified, duty to cooperate in dispute settlement is not only a matter of conventional law, but shares, by force of necessity, the customary law quality of a general obligation to settle disputes peacefully. While the dispute itself implies disagreement and non-cooperation, some kind of cooperation, in procedure or in substance, between the parties is needed for its resolution. Without cooperation, no settlement. Therefore a general, customary law-based duty of cooperation with a view to a settlement is inherent in the obligation to settle disputes peacefully. 41 Cf., for a different context, the two human rights pacts: in the CESCR we find more references to cooperation (Art. 2 para. 1; Art. 11 para. 1) than in the CCPR. Here as well general obligations to cooperate seem to be a correlate of less enforceability or justiciability. 42 The impact of ideology is demonstrated by the fact that Art. 28 of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of 29 April 1957, supra note 17, places significantly less emphasis on free choice and displays a preference for binding adjudication. 43 Art. 3 Pact of Bogotá, supra note 17. 44 Art. 280 UNCLOS, supra note 18. 45 Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 4, para. 5 of the Principle of Dispute Settlement. Art. 14 para. 1 of the Rio Framework Convention on Climate Change of 9 May 1992, 31 ILM (1992), 849. 48 Art. 10, para. 2, supra note 39.
The less institutionalized and the more flexible a dispute settlement procedure is, the less it assigns specific, legally fixed procedural duties of cooperation and the more its functioning depends on the general obligation to cooperate. 41 But despite the potential significance of that general obligation, it seems more helpful in practice to identify specific and concrete duties of cooperation whose fulfilment can be readily ascertained and measured and whose non-fulfilment constitutes clearly identifiable unlawful acts. Before turning to such concrete duties, let us look at the apparently anti-cooperative principle of free choice.
The Principle of Free Choice
Within the general obligation to settle their disputes peacefully, states are left, absent a specific contractual obligation to resort to a particular means, a wide margin of discretion. The relationship between the various settlement mechanisms is governed by the principle of free choice of means. This principle was designed within a perspective in which states are the primary actors, and ultimately stems from the principle of sovereignty.
A The Persistence of the Principle
International legal texts which emphasize the principle of free choice are plentiful. They were mostly adopted during the period of the Cold War, when preference for political means on the one side or for legal dispute settlement procedures on the other corresponded to the ideological split of the world: 42 see the Pact of Bogotá, 43 the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 44 or, as soft law, the Friendly Relations Declaration. 45 This tendency is most pronounced in the Manila Declaration of 1982, in which the virtues of negotiation (as opposed to adjudication) are especially highlighted. 46 But even in the ostensibly New World Order, the idea of free choice persists. This is illustrated, for instance, by the relevant provisions of the Rio Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992 47 or the Anti-personnel Mines Convention of 1997. 
B The Problem of Impasse
Obviously, the still-valid principle of free choice creates the danger of an impasse in dispute settlement, even if both parties act in good faith. If 'free choice' is the governing principle, one party may take the view that only negotiations can bring about a satisfactory solution, while the other party may consider that a court judgment constitutes the only satisfactory mode of settlement.
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Two constructions point a way out of this impasse. Firstly, one might argue that the principle of free choice is tempered by the antagonistic principle of cooperation, which might force or at least direct parties to reach an agreement on a single dispute settlement procedure. The second argument against the inevitable impasse is a teleological, effet utile type of argument, based on the idea that any legal rule or principle must at least have some effect. If we allow for an impasse, then the principle of dispute settlement would be disabled, undermined, empty. This cannot be the intention of the international community which has adopted this principle. If the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes is to mean anything, it must at least mean that the mechanism resorted to is that which is the least intrusive on sovereignty, and that is negotiation. We can therefore say that a duty to negotiate is an intrinsic element of the principle of dispute settlement; otherwise the principle would be devoid of meaning. 50 Therefore, in the absence of special contractual obligations, no state may, once a concrete dispute has arisen, refuse to negotiate.
Exhaustion of Negotiations as a Pre-condition for Resort to Adjudication?
I have just argued that a duty (at least) to negotiate is inherent in the principle of dispute settlement. The ensuing question is whether parties must, as a matter of conventional or customary law, in the event of a dispute, always negotiate first.
This question is a very practical one because it is used as a frequent objection to jurisdiction made by respondents, for instance before the International Court of Justice. For example, in the suit instituted by Nicaragua, the United States argued that the Contadora Peace process was pending, and that negotiations had not been exhausted. 51 If such an exhaustion of negotiations were a strict pre-requisite for , be submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section' (emphasis added). See also Art. 4 Pact of Bogotá, supra note 17, 'Once any pacific procedure has been initiated, whether by agreement between the parties or in fulfilment of the present Treaty or a previous pact, no other procedure may be commenced until that procedure is concluded' (emphasis added).
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Under Art. 5 paras 3 and 4 WTO DSU, supra note 18, the establishment of a panel may be requested by the complaining party after diplomatic procedures are 'terminated', but not before 60 days have elapsed after the complainant's request for diplomatic procedures. The 60-day interim period is supposed to encourage conciliation.
adjudication, non-exhaustion would entail a lack of jurisdiction, and the seized court would have to declare the application inadmissible.
A Negotiation Clauses and the Problem of 'Exhaustion'
In the early general and multilateral dispute settlement treaties up to the post-World War Two period, negotiations were stipulated as a pre-requisite to adjudication. 58 have confirmed this flexible interpretation of negotiation clauses, oriented towards the concrete circumstances of the case, and governed by the principle of good faith. In the Southern Bluefin Tuna dispute (Australia and New Zealand v. Japan), the political-exhaustion clauses of Article 16 para. 1 of the Bluefin Tuna Convention and of Articles 283 and 286 UNCLOS were pertinent. Australia and New Zealand had formally requested urgent consultations and negotiations with regard to Japan's unilateral 'experimental fishing program'. They were conducted for over a year, partly within the Commission for the Conservation of the Southern Bluefin Tuna, but led to no accord. Japan then commenced unilateral fishing, which was considered by the applicants as a termination of the negotiations and thus as an authorization to begin compulsory dispute settlement under Part XV, Sec. 2 UNCLOS. Japan, in turn, replied that it had no intention of terminating the negotiations. In an order indicating provisional measures, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) left it entirely to the claimants to conclude unilaterally that the possibilities of diplomatic settlement had been exhausted and dismissed the respondent's contention to the contrary. 59 An arbitral tribunal, constituted under Article 287 para. 1 lit. (c) UNCLOS and competent to decide on the main issue then looked more closely at the concrete circumstances of the case and held: Art. 4 para. 4 WTO DSU (supra note 18). The provision's wording covers only the case that the other Member 'does not respond' or 'does not enter into consultations'. But the time limits seem to apply also (absent a mutual agreement on another period) in those situations where consultations are entered into, but fail. Anyway, the consultations period is in most cases extended by mutual agreement. Art. 5 para. 4 DSU clarifies that even if within the 60-day period, the other side suggests third-party diplomatic settlement (good offices, conciliation, mediation), the complaining party may still (after 60 days) request the panel. Because of the impossibility of laying down a general rule on the exhaustion of negotiations, it seems reasonable to complement the 'negotiation clause' with simple time limits. For instance, the Energy Charter Treaty of 1994 speaks of a 'reasonable period of time' to be given for diplomatic settlement. 61 Other important international agreements are more precise. The most prominent examples are the World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and the NAFTA Agreement. Under the WTO DSU, consultations must be entered into within no more than 30 days. If consultations are not entered into, the complaining party must wait 30 more days, and then (after 60 days in total) may request a panel.
62
B No Customary-law Stepladder of Settlement Procedures
Absent specific stipulations, there is, I submit, contrary to a traditional assumption, no customary-law stepladder of dispute settlement procedures, ranging from the most sovereignty-conscious, least offensive means to the more intrusive ones; in other words, a general 'political-exhaustion doctrine' does not exist. The old assumption of a general, customary law-based stepladder feeds on the premise that sovereignty is a 'fundamental right', to be preserved as far as possible, from which any international duty must be wrought as a kind of concession.
But this theory is, firstly, not reconcilable with the idea of free choice (which works in both directions), and, secondly, it is contradicted by the fact that states consider it necessary to insert specific reservations in that sense in their agreements. law is any general rule to be found to the effect that the exhaustion of diplomatic negotiations constitutes a precondition for a matter to be referred to the Court.' 63 We here witness an important development in the case law, which refuses to focus on sovereignty as a starting-point for the determination of procedural duties in dispute settlement. This does not deny that, in the event of a dispute, it is most natural to talk first, and to define the conflict by formulating the positions, and this is what is normally done. However, respondent states can, as a general rule, not rely on pending negotiations as a bar to jurisdiction and thereby block adjudication. But this rule is, in turn, moderated by the principle of good faith: if negotiations or conciliation proceedings are ongoing and are meaningfully conducted by both sides, then the seizure of a court may appear as an abuse of the court procedure. Under such circumstances, a court may be obliged to decline jurisdiction in order to encourage a diplomatic settlement.
The Principle of Good Faith is a Source of Duties to Cooperate
We have just seen that the idea of good faith helps to determine when the complaining party may go to court. The principle of good faith has been acknowledged by the International Court to be an intrinsic element of international cooperation in general. 64 In the context of dispute settlement, the principle of good faith is referred to in various treaties 65 and other international documents.
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Concrete consequences, some of which I have already mentioned, are:
1. The parties must embark with sincerity on one dispute settlement procedure. 3. This also means that one party may not prematurely abandon the chosen procedure, for instance negotiations. In particular, parties must not abuse the court procedure. 4. Correspondingly, in the event of an objective failure of one strategy, the principle of good faith obliges the parties to continue to strive for settlement with a new means.
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5. Next, the principle of good faith requires complete cooperation of states with international criminal tribunals. 69 I will come back to this in Section 9. 6. Finally, good faith is required in the implementation of awards, especially, but not only, when those awards are non-binding.
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In sum, good faith relates to all stages of the settlement procedure, and obviously becomes more important the more flexible the procedures and the less concrete the parties' respective duties of cooperation are. Fortunately, concrete duties of cooperation do exist. The following sections offer examples in the field of adjudication, including arbitration and criminal justice. 
Cooperation in Adjudication A Submission to Jurisdiction
Because adjudicatory bodies issue binding awards which must be implemented by the defeated party, the traditional concept of sovereignty requires that both parties have consented at some earlier point to submit their dispute to the institution. In other words, when it comes to issuing legally binding awards, we have no compulsory jurisdiction in international law. 71 We only have moderations of the consensus requirement. Consent to adjudication remains the crucial act of cooperation in the field of legal dispute settlement.
Ex-Post Submission to Adjudication
The highest barrier to adjudication is raised when no adjudication is provided for prior to the outbreak of a specific dispute, but when, after its outbreak, both parties must agree to submit the dispute to a court or arbitration. The possibility of such specific ex-post agreements is, for example, mentioned in the 1993 C-Weapons Treaty.
2 Ex Ante Optional Submission
The parties bind themselves more tightly, if they abide to adjudication before the outbreak of a specific dispute, for all future disputes arising from a treaty, or for certain categories of disputes, under the condition of reciprocity. Such voluntary general submission to adjudication is encouraged by conventions or clauses dealing specifically with dispute settlement, the most prominent one being the optional clause of Article 36 paragraph 2 of the ICJ Statute. However, to date, only some 60 states (i.e., less than one third of the entire international community), have recognized as compulsory the jurisdiction of the ICJ. These declarations are, in proportion to the increased number of states entitled to make them, even less numerous than during the time of the PCIJ. Moreover, ample reservations 'often make more symbolic than real the obligation assumed by States making them'. 73 . If the parties to the dispute are not able to settle the dispute in accordance with paragraph 1 (i.e., negotiation or any other means) within no more than 12 months, the dispute shall be submitted for compulsory decision to the ICJ or to arbitration in accordance with Annex V.
for a multilateral instrument on dispute settlement the 1992 Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE, which foresees reciprocal declarations on ex ante submission to an arbitral tribunal. 75 Thirty-two states have ratified the Convention, but only five of them have declared that they recognize as compulsory, ipso facto and without special agreement the jurisdiction of such a tribunal. 76 
Ex ante Submission qua Membership to a Material Treaty Regime
Because states are extremely reluctant to give an isolated blanket permission to adjudication, the alternative means of establishing a 'compulsory' jurisdiction is to link it directly to the material treaty. This path has been chosen in important recent conventions. They do not contain optional clauses, but make adjudication compulsory. States wanting to become a party to the club must simultaneously accept jurisdiction of a court or tribunal. 77 This system reclaims primacy and exclusiveness for all WTO-related disputes. 78 However, the compulsory character of the dispute settlement mechanism is mitigated by the fact that the dispute settlement institution's recommendations are not centrally enforced and that compliance is currently the weak spot of the system. Arguably, the Member States' veto power has simply been shifted to the enforcement stage (cf. Art. 22 para. 6 WTO DSU). 79 Other conventions coupled with compulsory jurisdiction are the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, 80 and the Danube River Convention of the same year. 81 In the cases concerning questions of interpretation and application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the aerial incident at Lockerbie, the ICJ held that the 82 Art. 14 para. 1 of the Montreal Convention of 1971 (supra note 57): compulsory arbitration, or, if no agreement on the organization of the arbitration, unilateral referral to the ICJ. 83 Art. 286, Art. 287 para. 5 UNCLOS (supra note 18). 85 The intent of Art. 16 of the Bluefin Tuna Convention (supra note 68) is to remove proceedings under that Article from the reach of the compulsory procedures of Section 2 of Part XV of UNCLOS (supra note 18). The arbitration contemplated by Art. 16 is not compulsory, but autonomous and consensual arbitration provided for in the Tuna Convention Annex (see Arbitral Tribunal (supra note 60), paras 57-59). 86 Ibid., paras 57 and 62. requirements of that Convention's jurisdictional clause 82 were fulfilled, notwithstanding the pertinent decisions of the Security Council in this highly politicized matter. Given the failure of negotiations and the failure to agree on arbitration, the ICJ has compulsory jurisdiction under Article 14 of the Montreal Convention. 83 Another important, but debatable example of compulsory adjudication qua membership is the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. At first sight the Convention appears to foresee binding arbitration as a last resort. 84 But resort to compulsory arbitration under Article 281 UNCLOS is conditioned on the absence of an agreement to the contrary. This provision was interpreted in the recent Bluefin Tuna Arbitral Award as requiring only an implicit agreement to eclipse compulsory UNCLOS arbitration, in that case the Bluefin Tuna Convention of 1993. 85 The Arbitral Tribunal opined 'that UNCLOS falls significantly short of establishing a truly comprehensive regime of compulsory jurisdiction entailing binding decisions'. 86 The Tribunal concluded that, under the terms of UNCLOS itself, it needed consensual jurisdiction, which was absent due to the Japanese refusal, and that therefore the Tribunal could not reach the merits of the dispute. 87 This award may undermine compulsory jurisdiction in a largely decentralized international legal system. Its sovereignty-deferent argument that any agreement of the parties to exclude otherwise binding compulsory jurisdiction may be inferred implies a presumption against compulsory jurisdiction. It might in the future be used to block compulsory jurisdiction clauses elsewhere. Rights. Notwithstanding the fact that submission to jurisdiction was not compulsory, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal -once accepted by a state party to the Human Rights Convention -forms an integral part of the Convention. This function precludes any right to unilateral modification on the part of the Member States. Therefore, withdrawal from submission to jurisdiction is only possible by denouncing the treaty as a whole. The Inter-American Court thereby transformed the optional clause into a quasi-compulsory one. It justified this move with the specific, 'objective' and 'law-making' character of human rights treaties and emphasized the difference between human rights cases and interstate litigation. 89 However, treaties that are not human rights-related may seek to protect 'higher common values', 90 and the essential and indispensable function of the respective tribunal's compulsory jurisdiction is obvious when submission is made ab initio compulsory for the states parties to such a Convention.
Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie -Preliminary Objections
(b) The Inadmissibility of Reservations to Compulsory Dispute Settlement Clauses
With regard to material agreements foreseeing adjudication qua membership, the question arises whether states may opt out of adjudication by ratifying with a reservation to the respective dispute settlement clause. This is what Yugoslavia attempted in April 2001 with regard to the Genocide Convention. 91 The ICJ had, in 1996, on the application of Bosnia and Herzegovina, issued a judgment confirming its jurisdiction on the basis of Article IX of the Genocide Convention. 92 Yugoslavia requested a revision of that judgment under Article 61 of the Statute of the Court. It argued that its admission to the United Nations as a new member in 2000 constituted a 'new fact' which makes clear that Yugoslavia did not continue the international legal personality of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and was therefore not party to the Genocide Convention. 93 Leaving apart the problems of state continuity in this case and assuming, arguendo, that Yugoslavia could re-accede to the Genocide Convention, our question is whether a reservation to Article IX, added to its request for re-accession of March 2001, would have been admissible. I submit that it is not because a compulsory dispute settlement clause of this type, which is not an optional clause, precisely intends to rule out the necessity of a separate consent to adjudication beyond ratification of the material treaty. This object would be 
Moderations of the Consent Requirement
My conclusion on the cooperational act of consent is that consent to adjudication is, throughout the evolution of treaty law, given in a continuously earlier stage. The sooner that consent must be given and the more general it must be, the less foreseeable will be the outcomes of an eventual particular litigation and the greater the risk that the party will be forced by a later (unforeseeable) binding award into a specific behaviour. However, there is of course still no customary law obligation to consent to binding adjudication. 
B Cooperation to Resolve Conflicts of Jurisdiction
Another problem of cooperation in adjudication arises from the proliferation of courts, which entails conflicts of jurisdiction. 98 A recent clash arose in the swordfish dispute between Chile and the European Community. 99 Here Chile claimed that the EC failed to cooperate with the coastal state to ensure the conservation of the highly migratory species, in violation of UNCLOS. The EC claimed that the Chilean domestic law prohibition was inconsistent with the GATT 1994 provisions on freedom of transit.
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At the end of 2000, the EC therefore requested the establishment of a WTO panel against Chile, 101 whereas Chile initiated action under the dispute settlement provisions of Part XV UNCLOS. 102 Currently, this conflict of jurisdiction is in a state of postponement or has perhaps even been resolved by an amicable settlement, operative since March 2001, which effectively suspends proceedings in both fora. 103 We have here an example of the resolution of a jurisdictional conflict through cooperation.
The Doctrine of Non-frustration of Adjudication
The doctrine of non-frustration of adjudication is an important corollary to obligations to cooperate. Non-frustration means that judicial or arbitral proceedings will not be thwarted by one party's lack of cooperation.
A Non-appearance of a Party to a Dispute
The first application of the principle of non-frustration can be seen in the rules on non-appearance of one party, mostly of the defendant. Non-appearance occurs in all stages of proceedings before international adjudicatory bodies. I will limit myself to the ICJ. 104 Here, there have been at least five instances of defendants not appearing, mostly because they contested the jurisdiction of the Court. They might have feared that their appearance would be interpreted as a consent to jurisdiction (under the doctrine of forum prorogatum), but they certainly also sought to exercise pressure on the Court. The last case of this type was the Nicaragua proceeding of 1986, in which, after the Court had indicated provisional measures and found jurisdiction, the United States refused to participate further. 105 Article 53 of the Statute of the ICJ deals with this situation. Paragraph 1 of that provision reads: 'Whenever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, or fails to defend its case, the other party may call upon the Court to decide in favour of its claim.' To begin with, this paragraph implies that there is no legal obligation to appear. Nor does such an obligation figure elsewhere in the Statute or in the Rules of the Court. This also means that there is no direct procedural sanction for non-appearance. The absence of an obligation and of sanctions may be due to sovereignty concerns. However, the provision at least protects the Court and the other party to the dispute from obstruction by the non-appearing party: non-appearance does not terminate the proceeding. It is impossible for one state to paralyse the Court. Put differently: once a state has given its consent to ICJ jurisdiction, its unilateral decision to withdraw this consent in the course of an already pending proceeding is devoid of legal effects. This rule is an important manifestation of the idea of non-frustration.
However, the element of sanction that is embodied in the threat of a continuing proceeding is tempered by paragraph 2 of Article 53. Here it says: 'The Court must, before [deciding], satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction . . ., but also that the claim is well founded in fact and in law.' This provision precludes a judgment in default in a technical sense with the court relying on the facts as presented by the plaintiff. Article 53 forces the Court to make a full, in-depth, not merely summary, factual and legal assessment of the case. It may not, as in most municipal civil procedures, base its judgment on the plaintiff's factual allegations. 106 In this way, the procedural disadvantage suffered by the non-appearing party is minimized. The non-appearing state is thus protected, more than ordinary non-appearing parties in domestic proceedings under the laws of civil procedure of most states. The reason for this protection of the absent state again goes back to concerns of sovereign equality. As the ICJ formulated in the Nicaragua case: '[T]he equality of the parties must remain 107 ICJ, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua -Merits, supra note 12, at para. 31. 108 As non-appearance is indirectly 'sanctioned' by forfeiture of procedural rights, we might construe the duty to appear as a 'soft' duty (in German law on civil procedure called 'Obliegenheit'). 109 See G. H. Aldrich, The Jurisprudence of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (1996) , at 9-43, 458-463. 110 The most detailed analysis is S. M. Schwebel, International Arbitration: Three Salient Problems (1987), at 144-296; see succinctly also Collier and Lowe, supra note 29, 225-227. 111 Schwebel, supra note 110, at 214-215. the basic principle . . . The intention of Article 53 was that in a case of non-appearance neither party should be placed at a disadvantage.' 107 To conclude, we must admit that the ICJ statute's response to non-appearance oscillates between sovereignty-consciousness and the idea of non-frustration. It depends on the Vorverständnis of the observer which of the competing and antagonistic elements he or she ranks in the foreground.
Summing up: The principle of non-frustration becomes more important as obligations for cooperation become less specific and less enforceable. If there is no enforceable duty of cooperation and if there are no direct procedural sanctions for non-cooperation, then we have at least one 'sanction' in a larger sense: the proceedings will continue and a fully binding judgment or award will be issued. And because a non-pleading defendant cannot raise defences, this judgment is normally not in favour of the uncooperative party.
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B Truncated Tribunals
Another type of non-cooperation, relevant only in arbitral proceedings, is the failure to appoint the national arbitrator by one of the parties to the dispute, or to withdraw him under some pretext in the course of the proceeding. Such actions belong to the usual repertoire of tricks for delaying arbitration. For instance, during the work of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Iran very frequently forced its arbitrators to resign.
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Obstruction of this type leads to what is called a truncated tribunal. It has long been debated whether such a truncated tribunal has the authority to render a binding award. Nowadays, it is generally acknowledged that truncated tribunals may, as a rule, continue to hear a case and to render an award even in the absence of the party-appointed arbitrator. 110 This rule stems, first, from an effectiveness-oriented (effet utile) reading of the respective parties' arbitration clauses or agreements. It is to be assumed that parties providing for arbitration do not intend that either of the parties could unilaterally frustrate arbitration by withdrawing its arbitrator. 111 The second justification is the principle of non-frustration of the arbitral process, which is an indispensable element of the modern, i.e. post-World War II, philosophy of arbitration. When arbitration was regarded as a diplomatic, conciliation-like process, the agreement of the parties was an essential condition in every stage of the proceedings. But when, as today, arbitration has a quasi-judicial function, it is an intrinsic element of this conception that one party may not render nugatory the undertaking. 112 Consequently, modern rules on truncated tribunals, such as in the NAFTA Agreement or in the 1998 International Chamber of Commerce Rules on Arbitration, are effectively designed to overcome a blocking of the arbitral process, either by empowering an authority to appoint arbitrators or by allowing for binding awards despite non-participation of individual arbitrators.
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9 Duties of Cooperation in International Criminal Justice 114 The ICTY, the Rwanda Tribunal and the International Criminal Court are neither explicitly nor implicitly endowed with enforcement functions. Yet, both indispensable evidence and suspect persons are usually located in territories under sovereign authority of states. All criminal courts are therefore dependent on the cooperation of states. 115 The drafters of the respective statutes took this into account and imposed on all states the obligation to lend cooperation and judicial assistance to the courts. 'Article 29 of the Statute should therefore be read as conferring on the Tribunal a power to require an international organization or its competent organ such as SFOR to cooperate with it', according to the Trial Chamber.
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In a 1999 decision in the Simic proceedings, a Trial Chamber ruled on an important exemption from the duty to cooperate with the ICTY. 123 The question here was whether a former employee of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the ICRC, may be called to give evidence of facts that he came to know by virtue of his employment. The Trial Chamber found that the ICRC's operating principles of neutrality and impartiality creates a relevant and genuine confidentiality interest of the ICRC. 124 Cooperation in the form of testimony before the Court might be perceived by one or other of the parties to a conflict as taking a stand against them and might, as a consequence, have detrimental effects on present and future humanitarian operations of the Red Cross. Therefore the ICRC has an absolute and unqualified customary law right of non-disclosure of information. No balancing against the interests of justice is possible. The ICTY is definitely barred from admitting information obtained from a person while performing official ICRC functions and relating to that work. no free-standing obligation to cooperate. Art. 86 serves as a guideline for the interpretation of the specific obligations laid down in Part 9. 129 Kreß and Prost, in Triffterer, supra note 69, Art. 87, para. 32. 130 Art. 93, para. 1; similarly Art. 89, para. 1. One of the most critical issues in the negotiations of Part 9 was whether or not there should be a reference to the national provisions. The ultimately agreed text reflects the compromise. 131 An interesting question is whether we here have a self-contained regime, i.e. an exhaustive set of rules concerning the international wrongfulness of non-cooperation. On the one hand, the carefully balanced grounds for refusal to cooperate may be undermined by relying on a circumstance precluding wrongfulness under general customary law, such as a state of necessity (cf. Art. 26 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility (2000)), adopted by the Drafting Committee on second reading on 11 and to vote against loans for Yugoslavia in the World Bank and the IMF in the event of non-cooperation.
B Cooperation with the International Criminal Court
The legal basis for the obligation to cooperate with the ICC is Part 9 of the Rome Statute of 1998, 127 entitled 'International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance'. Its first clause, Article 86, is a general obligation to cooperate: 'States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in the investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.'
128 Court orders requesting cooperation under Part 9 will derive their binding force from the simple fact that they activate binding, contractual obligations of the states parties to the Statute. Court orders will therefore be binding 'secondary treaty law'. 129 The ICC cooperation regime contains some innovative elements departing from the traditional 'horizontal' regime of inter-state cooperation in criminal matters. First of all, new terms, such as 'surrender' to the Court, as opposed to 'extradition', manifest the novel, 'vertical' approach to cooperation. According to Article 91 para. 2 lit. c) of the Rome Statute, states responding to requests for arrest and surrender should take into account 'the distinct nature of the Court'. Strict grounds for refusal of cooperation, as they exist in almost every inter-state cooperation regime, are virtually absent. Under Article 99 para. 4, the Court has limited, but significant power to conduct on-site investigations.
On the other hand, the more traditional elements of form and procedure are: states parties surrender persons and render other forms of cooperation 'under procedures of national law'. 130 In substance, traditional solutions have not been radically abandoned. There still are grounds for refusal to cooperate, as in the inter-state 'horizontal' setting, but they are more flexible. For instance, mere postponement is envisaged (see, e.g., Article 93, para. 5).
The failure of a state party to cooperate with the Court will be addressed by an official finding of the Court and a referral of the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council (Article 87, para. 7 ICC Statute). The Security Council may then act under Chapter VII and oblige all UN Member States to cooperate with the Court. 131 States not parties to the Rome Statute might be obliged to cooperate with the ICC by virtue of Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions and corresponding customary law. 132 The said provision requires states to 'ensure' respect of international humanitarian law. This means that states parties to the Geneva Conventions must react appropriately to any violation of international humanitarian standards, even if the underlying act is not attributable to that state. It is conceivable that in a given case some form of cooperation with the Court constitutes the only way for non-states parties to the Rome Statute to discharge this obligation, 133 at least as far as war crimes are concerned, perhaps even with regard to other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.
Evaluation and Outlook
A The Foreground: Summary of Cooperational Duties
The main findings of the preceding parts may be summed up as follows: a general (but context-bound) duty to cooperate with a view to a settlement is inherent in the customary law obligation to settle disputes peacefully, because resolution of a dispute would otherwise be impossible. This general obligation comprises the duty at least to negotiate, as it would otherwise be meaningless. On the other hand, there is no customary law obligation to negotiate first, if the other party is willing to resort to another means of settlement, in particular to adjudication. Good faith relates to all stages of the settlement procedure, and it obviously becomes more important as the procedures become more flexible and the parties' respective duties of cooperation become less concrete.
In diplomatic third-party-based settlement, we find some, albeit weak, specific obligations of cooperation. First of all, an offer of mediation (or good offices, or conciliation) gives rise to at least one negative obligation of the parties to the dispute: they may not regard the offer as an unfriendly act. 134 When conciliation is made compulsory, as in many recent treaties, we have a procedural obligation to go through the procedure. In the absence of an award which binds the parties per se, cooperation becomes crucial in the phase of implementation of a mediator's or conciliator's recommendation. 135 The most important act of cooperation of the parties 136 Blaskic judgment, supra note 115, para. 26. 137 Ibid., at para. 35. 138 Kreß and Prost, in Triffterer, supra note 69, Art. 87 ICC Statute, supra note 69, para. 35. 139 The opposing camps of course reflected only roughly the East-West split. For instance, France and the USA both withdrew from the optional clause and the USA was never a party to the PCIJ.
is to agree on a material resolution of the dispute, but there clearly is no obligation to do so. In legal dispute settlement, too, the primary act of cooperation is consent, but in a different phase. Here we need consent to jurisdiction of a court or tribunal. This consent is formal and procedural, not -as in a successful political dispute settlement -a consent in substance. Here as there, we have no customary law obligation to consent. However, throughout the evolution of treaty law, we see a tendency to require consent in increasingly early stages. In particular, the instrument of compulsory adjudication qua membership to a material treaty, to which no reservations are possible, constitutes an important strengthening of adjudication.
In third-party dispute settlement, obligations, such as a contractual obligation to exhaust previous negotiations as a pre-requisite of jurisdiction, may at first sight exist only vis-à-vis the dispute settlement body, but they protect the other party to the dispute as well.
In highly institutionalized dispute settlement systems, obligations to cooperate even seem to be 'obligations erga omnes partes', which means that they are incumbent on every member state of the system vis-à-vis all other member states and posit a community interest in their observance. 136 They protect not only the other party to the dispute, but all other parties to the system. The reason is that cooperation in this instance is not only called for in order to resolve a specific dispute, but with a view to the good and sustainable functioning of the entire settlement system.
The failure to fulfil a concrete obligation to cooperate is normally a breach of an international obligation and triggers the state's international responsibility. 137 If, as in the case of the ICTY and the ICC, the court is entitled to make a judicial finding on a failure to cooperate, this is the formal establishment of an internationally wrongful act. 138 In sum, we can safely speak of an international law of cooperation in dispute settlement.
B The Background: Two Antagonistic Trends in Dispute Settlement
The cooperational duties just summarized must be seen against the background of two antagonistic trends in dispute settlement.
On the One Hand: Rise of Adjudication
On the one hand, we witness a rise of adjudication. The ideological battle between (mostly) Western partisans of binding adjudication 139 and (mostly) socialist/thirdworld proponents of non-binding, diplomatic dispute settlement, which essentially hinged on sovereignty, is over. Since 1989, reluctance to accept binding adjudication has somewhat decreased.
The rise of adjudication is manifest in the creation of new courts, which I have already mentioned. It is also illustrated by the fact that new actors participate in the process of adjudication. Although states are certainly still the primary actors -think of access to the ICJ or to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body -this primacy of states is eroding. Some of the most interesting duties of cooperation involve private-law corporations or individuals. I have mentioned the international criminal courts trying individuals, and the 'innovative and sweeping' 140 obligations of cooperation with those courts incumbent on the states parties. I have also mentioned the growing importance of mixed arbitration, and in this context the doctrine of non-frustration of arbitration functions as an incentive to cooperation in the arbitral process.
Finally, NGOs are engaged in international adjudication. 141 For example, international (and national) trade unions may sue states under Part IV D of the Revised European Social Charter of 1996. 142 In situations where NGOs do not themselves have standing, they may render assistance to the parties, e.g., by submitting amicus curiae briefs. 143 The 'privatization' of international disputes effected by the integration of non-state actors has the positive effects of avoiding inter-state conflicts and of improving the protection of material rights because the states' discretion (and reluctance) to exercise diplomatic protection is foreclosed. It also increases the effectiveness of adjudication because the strong self-interests of the private stakeholders contribute to promoting legal security. methods, 146 as well as in the trend to entrust a designated body of an organization or, under a multilateral convention, a conference or meeting of the states parties with compliance management in a non-adversarial context. A most recent example is the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety of 2000. 147 Another revitalization of political means lies in the new tool of compulsory or directed conciliation, which can be found in numerous multilateral conventions of the 1980s and 1990s. 148 All in all, it may well be that non-binding mechanisms will continue to dominate dispute settlement, albeit with the help of a new set of arguments and in novel forms.
C The Whole Picture: A Network of Cooperational Duties
The international law of dispute settlement, which is becoming increasingly institutionalized, may be imagined as a network of obligations. The network idea builds on, and intensifies, the concept of cooperation. While inter-state cooperation still presupposes horizontal relationships between sovereign actors, the network idea allows for hierarchy in the international legal system. A network is, as pointed out in the Introduction to this paper, something between anarchy and hierarchy. It is a mixture of vertical and horizontal relationships, a criss-cross of relationships. It is 149 Ibid., at para. 47. 150 partly rigid, partly flexible. The network embodies not only different types of cooperational duties, but also duties with different degrees of bindingness, depending, inter alia, on the different actors involved. Within this network, the duties to cooperate between the parties form the 'horizontal' threads, whereas the duties of the parties vis-à-vis the dispute settlement institution or mediator may be figuratively depicted as 'vertical' ones. Such a criss-cross is more and more acknowledged in international judicial reasoning: With regard to the ICTY and the International Criminal Court, it was debated whether the obligations to cooperate with the courts are 'horizontal' duties similar to those in state-state relations or 'vertical' obligations. The 'horizontal' approach to cooperation has sovereignty as its starting-point, favours references to domestic law and rigid grounds for refusals to cooperate. The 'vertical' approach presupposes a hierarchical relationship between the international courts and the states, attaches greater weight to community interests in international criminal prosecution and consequently refuses to give states a final say on their cooperation. The Appeals Chamber in the Blaskic case opined that '[c]learly, a "vertical" relationship was . . . established' between the ICTY and the UN Member States. 149 Referring to universal criminal jurisdiction, ICJ Justices recently held that states asserting universal jurisdiction 'invoke the concept of acting as "agents for the international community". This vertical notion of the authority of action is significantly different from the horizontal system of international law envisaged in the Lotus case.' 150 The hierarchical strand of the network is dominant where we have compulsory jurisdiction. The rise of adjudication, as just described, contributes to that strand. This phenomenon may be interpreted as a strengthening of constitutionalist, rule-of-lawconscious elements of the international legal order.
151 Audacious decisions such as the Inter-American Court's Bronstein judgment place emphasis on the constitutional features of some dispute settlement instruments.
On the other hand, Westphalian elements persist in the form of mere horizontal, inter-state cooperation in political dispute settlement. The Bluefin Tuna awards represent the Westphalian approach in which nothing goes without consent. Moreover, partisans of the Westphalian model can argue that almost all of the cooperational duties I have mentioned are contractual ones to which the states have 'voluntarily' adhered by signature and ratification. Relying on a formal notion of sovereignty and focusing on a state's free will to enter into contractual obligations or not permits the conclusion that sovereignty is of course not impaired by these rules. If, in contrast, we adopt a material view of sovereignty, it is not decisive that contractual obligations were entered into 'freely' or 'voluntarily'. What counts is that states have a substantially smaller manoeuvring space because of binding, even if only contractual, obligations to cooperate. The latter view is the one I prefer because adopting the formal perspective bears the risk of talking of sovereignty even when only an empty husk of sovereignty is left. In this perspective, the growing network of contractual obligations to cooperate in dispute settlement does modify sovereignty, and with it the Westphalian system.
Generally speaking, the international legal system is currently a system in transition, 152 in which the traditional guiding principle of state sovereignty is only in part being substituted by the guiding principle of the rule of law. As far as dispute settlement is concerned, we have seen that horizontal coordination has not only been complemented by a thick layer of cooperational duties, but that these layers are in part even replaced by hierarchies. The network image is supposed to visualize this transitional phase.
